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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is to focus on the role of market power where interconnection
and network access problems are involved. The Essay is organized by parts. Part I sketches the
European Union history with respect to open network provision (“ONP”) policy. In Part II, the
market-share concept of market power applied within Council Directive 97/33, European Com-
munity on Interconnection in Telecommunications of June 30, 1997 (“Interconnection Directive”)
is criticized as an important source for an oversized regulatory basis. Instead, the criteria for an
economically justified disaggregated regulatory framework for the ONP concept is pointed out
in order to localize the proper regulatory basis. It is shown that the regulatory basis should be
restricted to local cable-based networks (“monopolistic bottleneck areas”). Part III explains the
role of efficient private bargaining of interconnection/access conditions, as long as monopolistic
bottlenecks are absent. Next, Part IV analyzes regulation of interconnection to monopolistic bot-
tlenecks, particularly, the role of the “essential facility” doctrine. Finally, Part V discusses costing
and pricing issues of interconnection services within the ONP concept.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of 1998, market entry has been permit-
ted in all subparts of telecommunications networks, including
cable-based infrastructure and telephone services, in nearly all
European countries. As a consequence, problems of network ac-
cess as well as network interconnection have gained increased
importance. Global entry deregulation, however, does not auto-
matically imply the abolishment of all sector-specific regulation.
First, a long-term proper role of government intervention with
respect to technical regulations, for example, the coordination
and allocation of radio frequencies, the organization of number
portability, the design of standards, etc., remains in order to
guarantee an adequate framework for a competitive telecommu-
nications sector. Second, politically desired universal service
objectives remain to be organized by entry-compatible instru-
ments, for example, a universal service fund. Third, remaining
network-specific market power needs to be disciplined by regula-
tory instruments or competition policy, respectively. Future reg-
ulation of costing and pricing of interconnection services is
under debate within the individual European countries as well as
on the level of the European Union' as a whole.
The purpose of this Essay is to focus on the role of market
power where interconnection and network access problems are
involved.2 The controversy about the advantages and disadvan-
* Professor of economics at Albert-Ludwigs-Universitdt, Freiburg, Germany.
1. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R_ 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]).
2. For the analysis of technical regulations, the reader is referred to GONTER
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tages of obligations for network interconnection and detailed
regulation of tariffs, including control of the underlying cost
conditions, is the subject of discussions all over the world.
The Essay is organized by parts. Part I sketches the Euro-
pean Union history with respect to open network provision
("ONP") policy. In Part II, the market-share concept of market
power applied within Council Directive 97/33, European Com-
munity on Interconnection in Telecommunications of June 30,
19973 ("Interconnection Directive") is criticized as an important
source for an oversized regulatory basis. Instead, the criteria for
an economically justified disaggregated regulatory framework
for the ONP concept is pointed out in order to localize the
proper regulatory basis. It is shown that the regulatory basis
should be restricted to local cable-based networks ("monopolis-
tic bottleneck areas"). Part III explains the role of efficient pri-
vate bargaining of interconnection/access conditions, as long as
monopolistic bottlenecks are absent. Next, Part IV analyzes reg-
ulation of interconnection to monopolistic bottlenecks, particu-
larly, the role of the "essential facility" doctrine. Finally, Part V
discusses costing and pricing issues of interconnection services
within the ONP concept.
I. EUROPEAN ONP HISTORY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
A. The Concept of ONP in Partially Entry-Deregulated Markets
In 1990, the European Union took the first step towards lib-
eralizing telecommunications services by opening the market for
value-added network services ("VANS"). At that time, voice tele-
phone service as well as public telecommunications infrastruc-
ture networks were still legal monopolies controlled by state-
owned enterprises. Establishment of the internal market for
these liberalized services within Europe required harmonizing
conditions for access to and use of public telecommunications
KNIEPS, DIE AUSGESTALTUNG DES ZUK(JNFrIGEN REGULIERUNGSRAHMENS FOR DIE TELEKOM-
MUNIKATION IN DEUTSCHLAND [THE DESIGN OF THE FUTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
GERMAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS], (Diskussionsbeitr-ige des Instituts ffir Verkehrswissen-
schaft und Regionalpolitik [Discussion Paper of the Institut of Transport Economics
and Regional Policy] Nr. 22, Universitft Freiburg, 1995). The analysis of an entry-com-
patible alternative to cross-subsidization, the so-called universal service fund, has al-
ready been provided in Charles B. Blankart & Gfinter Knieps, What Can We Learn from
Comparative Institutional Analysis? The Case of Telecommunications, 42 KYLos 579 (1989).
3. Council Directive No. 97/33, OJ. L 199/32 (1997).
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networks and services. The ONP concept was introduced in the
European Commission's 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunica-
tions Services.4 It was given substance in Council Directive 90/
387/EEC of June 28, 1990' on the establishment of the internal
market for telecommunications services through the implemen-
tation of the ONP. Subsequent directives and recommendations
applied the principles of the ONP to leased lines, voice teleph-
ony, packet switched date services, and integrated services digital
networks ("ISDN").6
The purpose of the ONP policy during the period of partial
entry deregulation was to stimulate entry into the VANS market
and to ensure fair competition between VANS suppliers and the
VANS operations of the existing telecommunications organiza-
tions. Therefore, Article 3 of the Council Directive No. 90/387/
EEC7 laid down the following basic principles with which ONP
conditions must comply:
* conditions must be based on objective criteria;
* conditions must be transparent, and published in an ap-
propriate manner; and
" conditions must guarantee equality of access and must
be non-discriminatory, in accordance with Community
law.8
Furthermore, it was explicitly stated that ONP conditions must
not restrict access to public telecommunications networks or
public telecommunications services, except for reasons based on
essential requirements, e.g., security of network operations and
maintenance of network integrity. Focusing on the precondi-
tions for competition on the VANS market, only a minimally har-
monized offering of those public telecommunications networks
and public telecommunications services identified as being in
the European interest were required.
European Union's ONP policy may also have been pursued
4. See Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Dynamic European
Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommu-
nications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 290 Final (June 1987) [hereinafter Green
Paper].
5. Council Directive No. 90/387/EEC, O.J. L 192/1 (1990).
6. For an illustrative survey of these developments, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
ONP COMMITEE, REPORT, SUBJECT: REVISION OF THE ONP FRAMEWORK DIRECTIvE ONP,
COM 95 (1995).
7. Council Directive No. 90/387/EEC, art. 3, OJ. L 192/1, at 2 (1990).
8. Id.
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as an instrument to avoid structural separation between the
VANS activities of the existing telecommunications organiza-
tions and their traditional network activities.9 Because the estab-
lished carrier was correctly considered to be a monopolist on a
large part of the market, global regulation of market power was
still considered to be necessary, but left to the national regula-
tory authorities.
B. The Concept of ONP in Globally Entry-Deregulated Markets
Commission Directive 96/19/EC of March 13, 1996' 0 ("Full
Competition Directive") changed Council Directive 90/387/
EEC a ' by abolishing all legal entry barriers, including free entry
into the markets for telecommunications services as well as the
set-up and provision of telecommunications infrastructure net-
works. Because the telecommunications infrastructure in Eu-
rope is developing towards a set of interconnected networks,
owned and operated by many different organizations, the impor-
tance of interconnection is significantly increasing. Such inter-
connection may take place among different providers of long
distance networks, among providers of mobile or satellite net-
works, and public cable-based long distance networks. Intercon-
nection also takes place between long-distance telecommunica-
tions service providers to local networks, etc. This changing role
of interconnection also has led to a revision of ONP principles.
The basic philosophy behind the European Union ONP
policy seems to be that the infrastructure should be open to all
users in the European Union, to any service provider, and to any
provider of elements of the overall infrastructure. The Full
Competition Directive extends ONP principles to the new fully
entry-deregulated environment, focusing on interconnection
and public switched networks, and amending Commission Direc-
tive 90/388/EEC with Articles 4a-4d.12 In addition to the well-
9. Similar open network provision ("ONP") policies could also be observed in
other network industries, for example, railroads and airlines. See, e.g., Gfinter Knieps,
Wettbewerb in Netzen-Reformpotentiale in den Sektoren Eisenbahn und Lufiverkehr [ Competi-
tion in Network Industries-Potentials for Reform in Railroads and Air Transport] (1996).
10. Commission Directive No. 96/19/EC, O.J. L 74/13 (1996).
11. Council Directive No. 90/387/EEC, O.J. L 192/1 (1990).
12. Commission Directive No. 96/19/EC, art. 1(6), O.J. L 74/13, at 1-2 (1996)
(amending Commission Directive No. 90/388/EEC, O.J. L 192/10 (1990) by inserting
Art. 4a-4d).
S9320001
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known criteria of non-discriminatory, reasonable, and transpar-
ent conditions, the criterion of cost-orientation was explicitly in-
troduced. Priority was given to commercial negotiations be-
tween the interconnecting parties involved. The Interconnec-
tion Directive13 that was adopted in June 1997 and scheduled to
be implemented into the Member States' national laws by De-
cember 31, 1997, goes further than the Full Competition Direc-
tive 14 by introducing a two-tiered approach to ONP regulation.
Providers of public telecommunications networks or public tele-
communications services, which are classified as possessing sig-
nificant market power, are subjected to more restrictive ONP
regulation. Such regulation provides the general obligation to
provide network access under Section 4(2) of the Interconnec-
tion Directive15 and to carry the burden of proof that intercon-
nection charges are cost-based, that the principles for cost ac-
counting systems under Section 7(5) of the Interconnection Di-
rective16 have been followed, and that there is no possibility of ex
ante regulation of interconnection charges under Section 7(2)
of the Interconnection Directive.1 7 According to the Intercon-
nection Directive, an organization with a market share of over
twenty-five percent in a given telecommunications market is con-
sidered to possess a significant market power.18 Nevertheless,
the major responsibility with regard to ONP regulation still has
been left in the hands of the national regulatory authorities.
National regulatory agencies have the authority to deter-
mine whether an organization has significant market power. Ac-
cording to Section 4(3) of this directive, national regulatory
agencies are free to decide whether an organization with more
or less than twenty-five percent in a given telecommunications
market is to be classified as possessing market power. Moreover,
the principles for interconnection charges and cost-accounting
systems,19 including control of whether tariffs are cost-based, are
the responsibility of the national regulatory authorities. Thus,
the Interconnection Directive laid down the general principles
13. Council Directive No. 97/33, O.J. L 199/32 (1997).
14. Commission Directive No. 96/19/EC, O.J. L 74/13 (1996).
15. Council Directive No. 97/33, art. 4(2), O.J. L 199/32, at 37 (1997).
16. Id. art. 7(5), O.J. L 199/32, at 39 (1997).
17. Id. art. 7(2), O.J. L 199/32, at 38 (1997).
18. Id. art. 4(3), O.J. L 199/32, at 37 (1997).
19. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 199/32, at 38-39 (1997).
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of future ONP regulation, but left the responsibility for the con-
crete regulation of interconnection to the regulatory authorities
of the individual Member States.2 °
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE DISAGGREGATED
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO THE ONP CONCEPT
The Interconnection Directive introduced the criterion of
significant market power into the ONP regulatory debate for the
first time. It seems obvious that the criterion of twenty-five per-
cent market share is rather arbitrarily chosen. The national reg-
ulatory authorities, however, are currently engaged in the search
for sound economic criteria to localize network specific market
power as a starting point for remaining sector-specific regula-
tion.
A. The Necessity of a Symmetric Regulatory Approach
Symmetric regulatory conditions should neither advantage
nor disadvantage the former network monopolist. On the one
hand, all monopoly privileges must be abandoned. On the
other hand, all one-sided regulatory obligations, for example, to
cross-subsidize universal services, must end. "In general terms
symmetric regulation means providing all suppliers, incumbents
and new entrants alike, a level playing field on which to com-
pete: the same price signals, the same restrictions, and the same
obligations .... But all forms of asymmetric regulation contain
an intrinsic bias toward some firms or technologies .... 21
Even if one accepts criteria such as relative market share,
financial strength, access to input and service markets, etc., as a
starting point in order to evaluate the existence of market
power, the development of an ex ante regulatory criterion creates
a need for a more clear-cut definition of market power. Such
clear-cut definition is even more important because Vermutung-
skriterien22 on the basis of market shares can lead to wrong crite-
ria for government intervention in the telecommunications sec-
tor.
20. Id. art. 9, O.J. L 199/32, at 39-40 (1997).
21. Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive Telecommunications, 8
INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 55 (1996).
22. Vermutungskriterien roughly translates to criteria that form the basis for an as-
sumption or a logical conclusion.
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Therefore, it is important to develop and apply a disaggre-
gated approach of market power regulation. It is necessary to
differentiate between the areas where active and potential com-
petition can work and other, so-called monopolistic bottleneck
areas where the combination of economies of bundling and irre-
versible costs caused existing natural monopoly situation. While
sunk costs are no longer relevant for the incumbent monopoly's
decision-making, the potential entrant is confronted with the de-
cision of whether to build network infrastructure and, thus,
spend the irreversible costs. The incumbent firms, therefore,
have lower decision-relevant costs than the potential entrants.
Such lower decision-relevant costs create the scope for strategic
behavior of the incumbent firms, so that inefficient production
and monopoly profits will not necessarily result in a market en-
try. It can be demonstrated that the regulation of market power
is only justified in monopolistic bottleneck areas. In all other
cases, the existence of active and potential competition will lead
to efficient market results as shown on Table One.
Table One: A Disaggregated Approach to Market Power Regulation
Sub-market With Sunk Costs Without Sunk Costs
(1) (2)
Natural Monopoly Regulation of Market Potential Competition
(Bundling Advantages) Power (Non- (Contestable Networks)
Contestable Networks)
(3) (4)
No Natural Monopoly Competition Among Competition Among
(Bundling Advantages Active Providers Active Providers
Exhausted)
The pressure of potential competition alone can create an in-
centive for the active supplier to improve the quality and variety
of services as well as to produce more efficiently. These net-
works are therefore called contestable.23 An essential condition
for the functioning of potential competition in order to disci-
pline firms already providing network services is that the incum-
bent firms do not have asymmetric cost advantages in compari-
son with potential entrants.
23. See, e.g., WILmAm J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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An interesting question lies in the relation between "pure
economic" analysis and real life networks, including the services
that run over them. What about the reality of "contestable net-
works?" It seems obvious that the behavior of markets for net-
work services, as soon as competition works, becomes more com-
plex as assumed in the "simple" models of the theory of contesta-
ble markets. Examples may be the strategies of product
differentiation, price differentiation, goodwill, etc. Even strate-
gic behavior on competitive markets for network services, how-
ever, should not lead to the opposite conclusion to re-regulate
these markets again. In contrast, the very point of the disaggre-
gated approach is the development of the preconditions for com-
petition on the markets for network services. The only purpose
of the theory of contestable markets is, therefore, to localize the
stable network-specific market power that systematically hampers
the development of competition on the markets for network
services. Whereas strategic behavior and informational
problems do not lead to stable market power on the markets for
network services, monopolistic bottlenecks-due to sunk costs-
do create stable market power even if all market participants are
well informed. The development of a set of rules to deal with
transactions across the boundary between contestable networks
and non-contestable monopolistic bottlenecks is therefore im-
portant in order to guarantee the preconditions for competition
of the markets for network services.
Illustrative examples for contestable networks are the mar-
kets for telecommunications services, which are often provided
via service networks. Even the market for public telephone serv-
ices is contestable because suppliers of value-added services are
also prepared to offer telephone services after legal entry barri-
ers disappear. An important condition, however, is the guaran-
tee of number portability. The term "number portability" means
the ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at
the same location, the existing telecommunications numbers
without impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when
switching from one telecommunications carrier to another.
Even if the market shares of incumbent firms were large, ineffi-
cient suppliers would then be immediately confronted with rap-
idly decreasing market shares. But contestable sub-areas can
also be localized in the area of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture. The pressure of potential competition in wireless net-
2000]
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works, for example, satellite, microwave systems, and mobile
communication, is guaranteed as long as symmetric access to
complementary inputs, for example, right of way, radio spec-
trum, etc., is ensured. More generally, an important condition
for the effectiveness of actual and potential competition is that
all active and potential suppliers have equal, i.e., symmetric, ac-
cess to the complementary monopolistic bottleneck.
In contrast, in local cable-based networks, where sunk costs
are relevant, consumers, who would intrinsically be willing to
switch immediately to less costly firms, cannot do this. Market
entry, therefore, cannot be expected easily, if sunk costs are suf-
ficiently high and very relevant. Therefore, we can conclude
that sector-specific ex ante regulatory intervention in order to dis-
cipline market power can only be justified in non-contestable
networks, i.e., monopolistic bottleneck areas, where bundling in
combination with irreversible costs is relevant.
The aim of future regulatory policy, however, should not be
the global regulation of markets. Instead, only a disaggregated
regulation of non-contestable networks is justified. The aim is
then to localize the market power in monopolistic bottleneck ar-
eas and discipline this market power by regulatory intervention.
Asymmetry of market power due to monopolistic bottleneck fa-
cilities, however, does not by itself require asymmetric regula-
tion. Instead, the symmetry principle requires that all firms have
access to local telecommunications networks on terms identical
to those of the incumbent, i.e., non-discriminatory access. The
symmetry principle demands that only bottleneck facilities are
regulated, irrespective of whether the owner is the incumbent or
a newcomer. Table Two summarizes the disaggregated location
of market power.
1NTERCONNECTION AND NETWORK ACCESS
Table Two: A Disaggregated Location of Market Power in
Telecommunications Systems
Non-contestable
Competitive/ (Monopolistic
Contestable Bottleneck)
Terminal Equipment X -
Telecommunications Services X
(Including Voice Telephone Services)
Satellite/Mobile Networks X -
Long-Distance Cable Based Networks X -
Local Cable Based Networks X
B. The Fallacies of Asymmetric Regulation
There is a wide range of possible asymmetric regulation.
Whereas, in the past, legal entry barriers protected monopolistic
carriers, the regulatory pendulum now seems to swing in the op-
posite direction. Asymmetric regulation in favor of newcomers
is motivated by the conviction that, even after the abolishment of
the legal monopoly, the incumbent carrier would still possess a
factual monopoly position on the network infrastructure and the
normal voice telephone service. Therefore, initial support of
newcomers, at least for a sufficient transition period, has been
recommended recently in the national regulatory debates 4 as
well as on supranational level. For example, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), argu-
ing in favor of regulatory symmetry, i.e., competitive neutrality,
in their Working Party on Telecommunication and Information
Services Policies in April 1997,25 issued an amendment in Sep-
tember 1997 in favor of asymmetric regulation: "This does not
24. See, e.g., ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER & EBERHARD WrrE, GU-rACHTEN ZUR Zus-
TNADIGREIT FOR DIE VERHALTENSAUFSICHT NACH DEM DRrIrEN UND VIERTEN TElL DES
REFERENTENENTWURFS FOR EIN TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ (TKGE) [EXPERTISE ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCr CONTROL ACCORDING TO THE THIRD AND FORTH PART OF
THE PRELIMINARY VERSION OF THE GERMAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT (TKG)] 12 (1995);
Arnold Picot & Wolfgang Burr, Regulierung der Deregulierung im Telekommunikationssektor
[Regulating Deregulation in Telecommunications], 48/2 SCHMALENBACHS ZEITSCHRIFr
FUR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAITLICHE FORSCHUNG 173 (1996).
25. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SERVICES POLICIES-UNIVER-
SAL SERVICE AND PUBLIC ACCESS IN THE TECHNOLOGICALLY DYNAMIC AND CONVERGING IN-
FORMATION SOCIETY 11 (1997).
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ignore the need and the importance of having asymmetrical reg-
ulation, even in liberalized markets, while effective competition
is not widely established."26 All asymmetric regulation, however,
runs the risk of the regulators preserving existing competitors
rather than the competition process.
III. SYMMETRIC REGULATION OF MARKET POWER
Designing a disaggregated regulatory approach focusing on
network specific market power 27 can create a symmetric frame-
work of regulation. Applying this theory to the ONP concept,
the following lessons can be drawn.
* Stable network-specific market power in telecommunica-
tions systems can only be localized in local cable-based
networks. In all other areas, including telephone serv-
ices, satellite/mobile networks, or long-distance cable-
based networks, active and potential competition does
not allow for excessive profits. Even if market shares of
incumbent firms were large, inefficient suppliers would
lose their customers.
" As long as monopolistic bottlenecks are not involved,
private bargaining solutions on interconnection condi-
tions not only are beneficial to the carriers themselves,
but also improve the market performance of the net-
work services provided to the customers. Irrespective of
the market size of the carriers involved, inefficient sup-
pliers of interconnection services are rapidly confronted
with strongly decreasing market shares due to the pres-
sure of potential alternative network service providers.28
* Regulation of ONP conditions should be strictly limited
to the monopolistic bottlenecks. The market power in-
volved in monopolistic bottlenecks may seriously disturb
the bargaining over access conditions.29
26. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SERVICES POLICIES-CORRI-
GENDUM TO "UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND PUBLIC ACCESS IN THE TECHNOLOGICALLY DYNAMIC
AND CONVERGING INFORMATION SOCIETY" 3 (1997).
27. See, e.g., Gfinter Knieps, Phasing out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive Tele-
communications, 50 KYKLos 325 (1997).
28. See Part III.A.
29. See Part II.B.
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A. Unregulated Interconnection Among Contestable Networks
Consider the case where interconnection/access require-
ments arise among contestable networks. One may think of a
local community operating a mobile radio network and consid-
ering one or various opportunities for establishing a long-dis-
tance connection by microwaves, or of two specialized satellite
networks to be connected. Other examples are the horizontal
interconnection among different specialized value-added service
networks of telecommunications or the vertical interconnection
of a value-added service network into a microwave long-distance
network.
1. Efficient Private Bargaining of
Interconnection/Access Conditions
Potential competition performs the function of mitigating
market power. It can be expected that private bargaining of in-
terconnection/access conditions between the different network
owners will lead to economically efficient solutions. Strategic be-
havior can be excluded because every bargaining partner can
easily be substituted by a potential alternative network carrier
due to competitiveness of networks.
Private bargaining solutions on interconnection conditions
among contestable network carriers not only are beneficial for
the carriers themselves, but also improve the market perform-
ance of the network services provided to the customers. In-
dependent of the market size of the carriers involved, inefficient
suppliers of interconnection services are rapidly confronted with
strongly decreasing market shares due to the strong pressure of
potential alternative network service providers. The rapidly
changing U.S. market of computer and telecommunications
equipment during the 1960s and 1970s indicated the enormous
switching potential of the consumers.3 0 Government regulation
of such private bargaining processes would artificially disturb the
bargaining process and automatically lead to inferior solutions.
2. Unregulated Interconnection/Access Tariffs
Carriers of contestable networks do not possess market
30. See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. FISHER, ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MurrLATEI--Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM, A CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES STUDY (1983).
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power due to the potential competition of alternative network
carriers. Excessive interconnection/access charges, which allow
monopoly rents or insufficient network service qualities, would
immediately initiate switching to an alternative network carrier.
There is no need for government interventions aiming to disci-
pline market power of active network carriers if the underlying
networks are contestable.
The question arises as to whether interconnection tariffs re-
sulting from private bargaining can guarantee the viability of ef-
ficient providers of network capacities. Price regulations-with
the aim of achieving interconnection tariffs according to long-
run incremental costs, including fixed costs of capacity-would
either be superfluous or would violate the viability of the incum-
bent carrier. In case of long-run incremental costs to private in-
terconnection capacity being equal to stand-alone costs of inter-
connection facilities, cost-covering interconnection tariffs would
be the result of private bargaining." If common costs, i.e., over-
head costs, between the interconnecting networks, play a signifi-
cant role, then the problem of covering the difference between
stand-alone costs and incremental costs arises because the sum
of the incremental costs does not cover total costs. As a conse-
quence, the network providers must have flexibility to raise inter-
connection tariffs such that the total cost covering constraint,
i.e., viability condition, is fulfilled. In particular, they must be
free to allocate common costs depending on the price elasticity
of the relevant demand schedules. Ex ante allocations of over-
head costs according to fully allocated cost principles, however,
would be detrimental.3 2 They neither would be based on the
economically justified cost-causality nor take into account the de-
mand side considerations. As a consequence, regulators who set
interconnection rates on the basis of fully allocated costs may
31. Because the focus of this Essay is on analyzing regulatory problems of remain-
ing market power after legal entry barriers within networks are abolished, we ignore the
problem of cream-skimming (unsustainability) and the related discussion on re-estab-
lishing of legal entry barriers. See, e.g., Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing
in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 966 (1975); ManfredJ. Holler, Umstrittene Mdrkte
und die Theorie der reinen Kosten [Contestable Markets and the Theory of Pure Costs] in JOHAN
M. GRAF VON DER SCHULENBURG & HANS W. SINN, THEORIE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK-
FESTSCHRIFT ZUM FUNFUNDSIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG VON HANS MOfLLER [THEORY OF COM-
PETITION POLICY-PUBLICATION IN HONOR OF HANS MOLLER] 146 (1990).
32. See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME-
STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 212 (1978).
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promote inefficient bypass activities, even when efficient, i.e., via-
ble, market solutions exist.
Pricing rules enforced by regulatory agencies in order to al-
locate overhead costs cannot solve the problem. The most popu-
lar methods of pricing access are those that use the principle of
fully distributed costs. For example, a proportional-sharing rule
distributing the common costs among the complementary net-
works in proportion to the incremental costs, such that the rela-
tive markup is equal, 33 may create incentives for inefficient by-
pass of interconnection facilities. If, for example, the stand-
alone costs of a specialized entrant for building a separate net-
work were lower than the incremental costs of interconnection
capacities plus the symmetrically allocated common costs, then
private bargaining would result in lower markup requirements
for the entrant. Nevertheless, the bargaining result would be ef-
ficient because the competitor also contributes to cover com-
mon costs. In contrast, a proportional-sharing rule induces inef-
ficient cost duplications because it creates incentives for ineffi-
cient bypass of the entrant. In a similar way, it can be shown that
the many other possible fully distributed cost principles may in-
duce inefficient bypass activities as well.
In the context of unbundling of networks, William Baumol
has proposed an access-pricing rule, called the "efficient compo-
nent pricing rule. 34 Suppose that entrants supply a component
in competition with the incumbent, for which, however, they
need access to the incumbent's facility. This rule states that the
efficient interconnection/access charges to the single-supplier's
component will cover the incremental costs of this component
plus the opportunity costs, which include any foregone revenues
from a concomitant reduction in the single-supplier's sales of
the complementary component. The basic idea behind this rule
is that an entrant on the competitive segment should only enter
if he is more efficient. For the case of contestable networks,
however, an enforcement of the "efficient component pricing
rule" is superfluous. Because excessive profits on the competi-
tive part of the network do not exist, "opportunity costs" in the
33. See, e.g., William B. Tye, Pricing Market Access for Regulated Firms, 29 LOcISTICS &
TRANsp. REV. 39, 46 (1993).
34. See William J. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'L J.
TRANsp. ECON. 341 (1983); WiLLiAm J. BAUMOL &J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETI-
TION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 94 (1994).
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sense of foregone profits are zero, and subsequently intercon-
nection/access tariffs automatically reflect real opportunity costs
of network access, including congestion costs to use the single-
supplier's component irrespective of who uses this facility. If
common costs between different networks must also be covered,
then the "efficient component pricing rule" may be interpreted
to argue in favor of pre-entry allocation of common costs. As a
consequence, incentives for inefficient bypass could be created,
especially in situations where stand-alone costs of a specialized
entrant would be below the sum of incremental costs and the
portion of common costs attributed by the "efficient component
pricing rule." In contrast, under such circumstances, private
bargaining would result in lower markup requirements for the
entrant. Again, the bargaining result would be efficient because
the competitor also contributes to cover common costs without
incentives for inefficient bypass.
B. Regulation of Interconnection to Monopolistic Bottlenecks
1. The Impact of Market Power on Bargaining of
Interconnection/Access Conditions
In contrast to interconnection among contestable networks,
the market power involved in non-contestable network infra-
structures fundamentally disturbs such bargaining processes.
One extreme alternative could be vertical foreclosure of compet-
itors on a complementary service market. Such tying can be
used as a method of price discrimination, enabling a monopolist
to earn higher profits.35 Another way of abusing market power
within the bargaining process on interconnection/access condi-
tions is to provide insufficient network access quality or excessive
interconnection charges. An example of inferior access condi-
tions is lower quality access to local telephone networks offered
to competitive long distance-carriers. Monopolistic interconnec-
tion/access charges are another danger of the power of the non-
contestable networks market.
2. Regulatory Instruments to Discipline Market Power
The "essential facility" doctrine seems to be an adequate
35. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN-nTRusr LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171
(1976).
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starting point for government interventions when market power
is involved in interconnection/access processes. Well-known
and often applied in U.S. antitrust law, the "essential facility"
doctrine gains increasing importance also in European competi-
tion law.36 The focus is on access on equal terms for all competi-
tors to monopolistic bottlenecks. The "essential facility" doc-
trine has developed in the United States through the application
of the Sherman Act.3
7
Liability under the "essential facility" doctrine is based on
the following criteria: (1) control of an essential facility by a mo-
nopolist, i.e., endowing monopoly power; (2) a competitor's in-
ability practically or reasonably to duplicate the facility; (3) the
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasi-
bility of providing the facility.38 It is obvious that the precondi-
tions of the "essential facility" doctrine are not fulfilled in the
case of interconnection/access among contestable networks be-
cause competitors always possess access to potential alternative
networks. There simply is no case of market power. If an incum-
bent carrier were to foreclose access or to behave in other as-
pects in a non-competitive way, then new network providers
would arise automatically. In such a situation, the new network
providers' emergence would not depend on the market share of
the incumbent carrier. The application of the "essential facility"
doctrine to interconnection/access among contestable networks
would even be detrimental because it would artificially restrict
36. See, e.g., Daniel Glasl, Essential Facilities Doctrine in EC Antitrust Law: A Contribu-
tion to the Current Debate, 6 EUR. COMPETION L. REv. 306 (1994).
37. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), has two major provisions. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said pun-
ishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides identical criminal sanctions for attempts or
conspiracies to monopolize. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanour. . . ." Id. § 2.
38. City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 995 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th
Cir. 1992).
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degrees of freedom in the search for optimal bargaining solu-
tions among the market participants.
As a consequence, the "essential facility" doctrine should be
applied in a restrictive manner only to those interconnection/
access cases where market power at least on one side is involved.
In U.S. antitrust law, the "essential facility" doctrine has been
applied in a case-by-case procedure to specific infrastructures,
such as terminal railroads and local electricity networks of mu-
nicipalities. In spite of the purpose of the "essential facility" doc-
trine to restrict monopoly power, interpretations of this doctrine
by different U.S. courts varied over time. One controversial issue
was whether the feasibility of providing the facility to a competi-
tor would be an absolute criterion or whether valid business rea-
sons would be a rationale for a refusal to deal with a direct com-
petitor. This quite elusive interpretation can easily be criticized
because, obviously, the fact that granting access would reduce
the profit of the owner of the facility cannot by itself constitute a
valid business reason.
39
The proper application of the "essential facility" doctrine,
however, does not imply demand-oriented unbundling. The "es-
sential facility" doctrine is the tailor-made answer to a specific
competition problem: the vertical integration between a com-
petitive market and a complementary, monopolistic bottleneck
area. The provision has two elements: (1) localization of the
monopolistic bottlenecks as a factual finding, and (2) the right
to access as a legal consequence. The purpose of the "essential
facility" doctrine is to overcome the structural market entry bar-
rier caused by vertical integration with a monopolistic bottle-
neck. A claim merely to access elements of the monopolistic bot-
tleneck can therefore not be derived from the "essential facility"
doctrine. Nor does this doctrine require the vertically integrated
company to change its network in accordance with the wishes of
its competitors on the market that is open to attack. The com-
petitor must take the network as it is.4 °
39. See William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Es-
sential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337, 346 (1987).
40. See CHRISTOPH ENGEL & GONTER KNIEPS, DIE VORSCHRIFTEN DES TELEKOM-
MUNIKATIONSGESETZES OBER DEN ZUGANG ZU WESENTLICHEN LEISTUNGEN: EINE JURIS-
TISCH-OKONOMISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG [THE PROVISIONS OF THE GERMAN TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS ACT CONCERNING THE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL FACIuTiES: A LAw AND ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE] (1998).
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The enforcement of the "essential facility" doctrine cannot
be considered independently from the terms of access provided
to the competitors. It is obvious that the effect of a total denial
of access by refusing to offer a bundled and an unbundled rate
can also be achieved by offering access on such burdensome
terms that the foreclosure of competition would have the same
effect.4 1 An effective application of the "essential facility" doc-
trine must therefore be combined with adequate regulation of
access conditions, such as quality and tariffs. Partly, this require-
ment has been included in the criteria of the "essential facility"
doctrine itself. Not only the denial of the use of the facility, but
also the imposition of restrictive terms for the use of the facility
with the consequence of substantial harm to competition has
been considered in earlier case law as a criterion for the "essen-
tial facility" doctrine.4 2 Nevertheless, a significant scope for in-
terpretation remains, especially given the historical fact that anti-
trust lawyers typically do not specialize in dealing with complex
matters of access conditions.
As a consequence, enforcement of the "essential facility"
doctrine should be combined with the application of regulatory
instruments focusing on access conditions, especially regulation
of interconnection/access charges. Another advantage of the
explicit combination of regulatory concepts with the antitrust
concept of the "essential facility" doctrine is the shift from case-
by-case applications towards the definition of a class of cases
characterized by non-contestable network infrastructures. In
contrast, the rather global concept of the abuse of market power
by dominant firms requires that, in a narrow sense, the relevant
market be established and that the meaning of dominance be
clarified.43 Nevertheless, a generalization of the concept of the
"essential facility" doctrine seems possible focusing on the class
of cases where market power is based on the same reasons.
Within networks, this leads to the non-contestable network infra-
structures.
Similar to the case of interconnection among contestable
networks, interconnection/access charges must cover not only
41. See, e.g., Tye, supra note 39, at 359.
42. Id. at 346.
43. See KEN GEORGE & ALEXIS JACQUEMIN, COMPETITION POUCY IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 206, 228 (W. Commanor ed., 1990).
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long-run incremental costs, but also total costs of the monopolis-
tic bottlenecks. Common costs to provide contestable and non-
contestable networks must be covered by interconnection/access
charges, without the owner of an "essential facility" being ac-
cused of the abuse of market power. If, however, the "efficient
component pricing rule" was applied in such a manner that the
monopolist's "opportunity costs" of providing access also in-
cluded monopoly profits as part of its foregone opportunities in
the contestable segment, then market power of the non-contest-
able network carrier would be cemented. The application of the
"efficient component pricing rule" in this context would be anti-
competitive because potential entrants in the complementary
contestable networks would have to reimburse incumbents for
their foregone monopoly rents. Such artificial "opportunity"
costs should not be confused with real opportunity costs for the
usage of scarce capacities of bottleneck facilities.4 4
A reference point for regulatory rules concerning intercon-
nection/access charges should be the coverage of the full costs
of the monopolistic bottleneck in order to guarantee the viabil-
ity of the facility. In particular, when alternatives to bypass an
"essential facility" are absent, the cost-covering constraint may
not be sufficient to forestall excessive profits. Therefore, the in-
strument of price-cap regulation should be introduced.45 Its ma-
jor purpose is to regulate the level of prices, taking into account
the inflation rate, i.e., consumer price index minus a percentage
for expected productivity increase. It seems important to restrict
such price-cap regulation to the non-contestable parts of net-
works where market power due to monopolistic bottleneck is re-
ally creating a regulatory problem. In other subparts of net-
works, price setting should be left to the competitive markets.
The question remains whether regulators should be also al-
lowed to prescribe pricing rules that focus on tariff structures
within monopolistic bottlenecks. There are serious arguments
for regulators to refrain from detailed tariff regulation. First,
firms should have the flexibility to design pareto-superior op-
44. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection
Pricing: How Efficient Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule?", 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 557
(1995) (arguing that if "Efficient Component Pricing Rule" is above marginal cost, then
there will be economic distortion).
45. See, e.g., Michael E. Beesley & Stephen C. Littlechild, The Regulation of Privatized
Monopolies in the United Kingdom, 20 RAND J. ECON. 454 (1989).
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tional tariff schemes.46 Pricing rules prescribed by the regulator
could induce inefficient bypass activities. For example, a first
pricing rule could be to access tariffs according to long run aver-
age costs of the "essential facility." Because in such a case a dif-
ferentiation among different user groups according to different
price-elasticity is not possible, incentives for inefficient bypass of
the bottleneck facility may be created for certain user groups. A
second pricing rule would be to access pricing according to the
Ramsey pricing principle.47 Markups on the marginal costs of
access to the monopolistic bottlenecks are chosen according to
the elasticity of demand for network access in relation to social
welfare given the cost-covering constraint. Ramsey prices could
become unsustainable, however, even if strictly applied to mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks. The technological trend towards the un-
bundling of monopolistic bottleneck components increases the
possibilities for inefficient bypass.
Second, the danger arises that regulators extend the regula-
tory basis, including the contestable subparts of networks. From
the point of view of increasing static or short-run efficiency, such
behavior could even be justified by welfare theory. It is well
known that extending the regulatory basis can reduce efficiency
distortions by applying Ramsey pricing. Nevertheless, such an
endeavor would, in fact, mean a return to fully regulated net-
works, including price regulation and entry regulation of the
contestable subparts. Such fully regulated networks would not
be a suitable response to deregulation.48
In any case, regulators should not be allowed to intervene in
the competitive price-setting process within the contestable sub-
parts of networks. Otherwise the competition process within the
contestable networks would be severely hampered. Regulation
of interconnection/access conditions should be strictly limited
to those parts of networks where market power has been local-
ized. The design of pricing rules should be within the decision
making process of the firms.
46. See, e.g., Robert D. Willig, Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules, 9 BELL J.
ECON. 56 (1978).
47. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Margi-
nal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 265 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Sylvester Damus, Ramsey Pricing by U.S. Railroads-Can It Exist?, 18 J.
TRANsP. ECON. & POL'Y 51 (1984).
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IV. COSTING AND PRICING OF INTERCONNECTION SERVICES
WITHIN THE ONP CONCEPT
The German Telecommunications Act of July 25, 19964" re-
quires the charges for interconnection and other special net-
work access to be based on the cost of the efficient service provi-
sion. In the meantime, the Wissenschaftliches Institut ffir Kom-
munikationsdienste ("WIK") has developed a so-called
"Analytical Cost Model" for the local network, 50 which is cur-
rently under critical debate.51 In the following Section, I shall
argue that the calculation of the costs of efficient service provi-
sion is a genuine entrepreneurial task and should not be taken
over by regulatory agencies.
A. The Role of Long-Run Incremental Costs in Determining
Interconnection Prices
It is well known that, even after complete entry deregula-
tion, economies of scale and economies of scope create common
costs that cannot be directly attributed to the individual network
services. Although activity-based costing can help to identify the
directly attributable costs to specific products, it is still not possi-
ble to declare all costs as incremental costs without applying eco-
nomically unjustified allocation of common costs. Provided that
the established network carrier is determining incremental costs
based on decision-oriented accounting methods, it becomes im-
mediately clear that the sum of the incremental costs does not
allow survival. In fact, the established firm must also cover its
product-group specific costs as well as the firm-specific overhead
costs by means of markups on the long-run incremental costs
49. Telekommunikationsgesetz [German Telecommunications Act], v. 1.8.1996
(BGB1. I S.1120) (F.R.G.). The German Telecommunications Act, in German and in
English, is posted on the World Wide Web at the German Federal Ministry for Posts and
Telecommunications' website. See German Federal Government, (visited Oct. 30,
1999), <http://www.bundesregierung.de> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
50. WISSENscHAFIruCHES INSTITUT FOR KOMMUNIKATIONSDIENSTE, AN ANALYTICAL
CosT MODEL FOR THE LocAL NETWORK-CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (1998) (prepared by
Wissenschaftliches Institut ffir Kommunikationsdienste for Regulatory Authority for
Telecommunications and Posts).
51. See, e.g., Gfinter Knieps, Der Irrweg Analytischer Kostenmodelle als Regulatorische
Schattenrechnungen-Eine Kritische Analyse der Stellungnahmen zum WIK-Kostenmodell [ The
Fallacy of Bottom-up Cost Models-A Critical Analysis of the Comments to the WIK-Cost Model],
11 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 598 (1998).
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("LRIC"). In order to avoid inefficient bypass activities of en-
trants, the established carriers should raise market-driven mark-
ups. An obligation to provide the services according to LRIC,
however, would disturb the symmetric treatment of an infra-
structure owner and service provider. Incentives to be the owner
of infrastructure for interconnection and network access would
disappear because it would be cheaper to use the infrastructure
of competitors and to avoid a contribution to the common costs.
Symmetric treatment of owners and users of infrastructure there-
fore requires that the stand-alone costs of network infrastructure
must be covered.
B. Management Accounting Versus Pseudo-Data Models
1. The Obsoleteness of Historical Cost Accounting
In competitive industries, the value of the firm's productive
assets is equal to the discounted, i.e., present, value of the antici-
pated net cash flows earned by the assets over their remaining
useful life. These net cash flows are determined by competitive
market forces and the firm's actions, but are not influenced by
book asset value. In regulated industries, however, the value of
the firm's assets in place and the rate base has been strongly
influenced by regulated depreciation charges. The regulatory
agencies were under political pressure to keep down the local
rates and, consequently, the capital costs of local networks. This
pressure, in turn, caused artificially low depreciation charges
and a very long lifetime without sufficiently considering techni-
cal progress, changed substitution possibilities, etc.
Although it is true that historical cost accounting is obso-
lete, the reform towards decision-relevant costing should still be
based on management and financial accounting data. Manage-
ment accounting approaches are based on real costing data, ob-
serving the relationship between input-prices, outputs, and the
costs of production. In contrast, engineering-economic models,
i.e., process analysis approaches, develop pseudo-cost data. After
describing the production function from engineering data, the
cost-output relationship is then derived as a result of assumed
global optimization behavior. It shall be shown in the following
section that, instead of engineering-economic models, an ade-
quate reform of management accounting is needed, based on
forward-looking cost accounting methods. Moreover, it should
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become clear that the concept of an efficient network needs fur-
ther elaboration. Whereas current cost accounting methods
take into account, by their very nature and as long as it is effi-
cient from a forward-looking perspective, the path-dependency
of network evolution, engineering-economic models usually ig-
nore the strategy of successive upgrading of networks.
2. The Fallacies of Pseudo Data Models in Determining Long-
Run Incremental Costs
In the following, I shall argue that engineering-economic
models are inadequate for determining the long-run incremen-
tal interconnection costs of interconnection services of estab-
lished carriers. Process analysis is placed on simulating the pro-
duction function from engineering data. After describing the
production function, the cost-output relationship is then derived
as a result of assumed optimization behavior. Instead of real ac-
counting data, the cost-data developed by engineering-economic
models are simulated, i.e., pseudo, data, their informational
value strongly dependent on the quality and the characteristics
of the underlying process model. Although the process analysis
approach was not very popular for a long time,5 2 it has also been
applied in the field of telecommunications.5 3 David Gabel and
Mark Kennet developed the so-called Local Exchange Cost Op-
timization Model ("LECOM") in order to generate data to ad-
dress the issue of economies of scope in local telephone net-
works.54 With LECOM, it became possible to solve the problem
of selecting the combination and location of facilities that mini-
mized the costs of satisfying varying levels of demand.5 The
three types of facilities within the local exchange carrier's net-
work are the local loop, switching, and trunking. The local loop
is composed of facilities that provide signaling and voice trans-
mission paths between a central office and the customer's sta-
tion. The central office houses the switching computer that con-
nects a customer's line either to another customer who is served
52. See James M. Griffin, The Process Analysis Alternative to Statistical Cost Functions:
An Application to Petroleum Refining, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1972).
53. See DAVID GABEL & MARK D. KENNET, ESTIMATING THE COST STRUCTURE OF Lo-
CAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE NETWORK (1991).
54. Id.
55. See David Gabel & Mark D. Kennet, Economies of Scope in the Local Telephone
Exchange Market, 6 J. REG. ECON. 381, 386-90 (1994).
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by the same switch or to an inter-office trunk. Calls between cen-
tral offices are carried on trunks. The model takes a city's
dimensions and customer usage level as data. LECOM then
searches for the technological mix, capacity, and location of
switches that minimize the annual cost of production. The non-
linear optimization model optimizes the location of the switches.
In principle, there is an infinite number of possible configu-
rations to be considered. For each economically and technically
feasible combination of switches, a certain number of possible
iterations are allowed. Iteration involves the calculation of the
cost of service at one or more alternative locations for the
switches. For each market and a given level of demand, LECOM
evaluates a number of different switch combinations. In other
words, LECOM has been designed to develop a green-field ap-
proach. Gabel and Kennet have already pointed out the impor-
tant limitations of engineering optimization models. 6 First, op-
timization models typically are not designed to quantify the less
tangible costs of providing service, such as administrative costs.
Second, LECOM is limited by bounded rationality. Because
global optimization is not feasible, only a reasonable number of
possible solutions are examined. It is obvious that a great degree
of freedom exists in the search for "plausible" solutions. Third,
the value of the pseudo-data approach ultimately rests on the
quality and completeness of the underlying process models.
Measurement and behavioral errors still persist, even in the best
model.
Beyond this critique of engineering-economic models, the
most important point is that they are simply the wrong tools for
deriving the LRIC of established carriers. Even if the analysis is
based on a "scorched node" assumption that implies that the in-
cremental cost estimate reflects the current network topology,
engineering-economic models-by their very nature-are not
able to derive the LRIC of the efficient network of the estab-
lished carrier. The reason is the path-dependency of networks.
This result means that, given the network history, the gradual
upgrading is efficient if the additional costs of upgrading are
lower than the costs of building new network facilities. This cor-
56. Id.
57. James M. Griffin, Long-Run Production Modeling with Pseudo-Data: Electric Power
Generation, BELLJ. ECON. 125 (1977).
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relation implies that the economically efficient incremental costs
must be calculated on the basis of the factual costs of the incum-
bent's network in place, including its history of upgrading.
As long as the incremental costs of upgrading of the estab-
lished carrier are lower than the stand-alone costs of a hypotheti-
cal new network of an entrant, the required network capacity
should be provided by the historically grown network of the es-
tablished carrier. This correlation is true because such entry
would replace the service of the incumbent firm over its existing
network, not the service of a hypothetical efficient provider.
The path-dependent costs of gradual upgrading are then eco-
nomically efficient as well as relevant from a forward-looking
costing perspective.58 Therefore, they also should not be con-
fused with sunk costs because the upgrading strategy is then in-
centive-compatible, even if all investments could easily be shifted
to another market, such as a perfect "second-hand" market.
Under efficient upgrading strategies, the economic value of the
existing network components is the only basis for decision-mak-
ing. It is simply not in the spirit of the engineering-economic
models to take into consideration this network history. Even
under the scorched node assumption, engineering-economic
models use the high degree of freedom of simulation models to
find cost-minimizing solutions by ignoring the historically-grown
network infrastructure that is already in existence.
Beyond this fundamental critique of the usefulness of engi-
neering-economic models for determining the LRIC of the es-
tablished carriers, other points of criticism have already been in-
dicated in the studies by the National Economics Research Asso-
ciates, Inc. ("NERA"), a New York-based economics consulting
firm, for the Office of Telecommunications ("OFTEL"), the Brit-
ish regulatory agency.59 In particular, the insufficient determi-
nation of the factual usage of network capacities and of the fac-
tual routing patterns has been stated.
58. As long as upgrading is an efficient strategy, its costs should not be confused
with phantom costs due to overvaluation of installed investment (based on differences
between economic and historical depreciation patterns). See Part IV.B.3.
59. See NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE METHODOLOGY TO CALCU-
LATE LONG-RUN INCREMENTAL COSTS (1996); NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCI-
ATES, RECONCILIATION AND INTEGRATION OF Top DowN AND BOTTOM UP MODELS OF IN-
CREMENTAL COSTS (1996); NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RECONCILIATION
AND INTEGRATION OF Top DowN AND BOTTOM Up MODELS OF INCREMENTAL COSTS, FINAL
REPORT (1996).
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3. The Necessity of Reforming the Management Accounting:
From Historical Cost Accounting to Current Cost Accounting
It is often argued that the necessary and overdue departure
from historical cost accounting in a competitive environment
can only be accomplished by introducing engineering-economic
models. This argument is, however, particularly misleading be-
cause the necessary reform should still be based on management
accounting. In the following, I shall argue that a transition from
historical-cost accounting to forward-looking current cost ac-
counting is unavoidable. Under competitive conditions, the val-
uation of the assets and the depreciation charges must reflect
their economic values. The true economic value of any produc-
tive asset is the discounted present value of the anticipated
stream of net earnings that it is capable to produce. Thus, the
economic depreciation of a productive asset during a time pe-
riod is the decrease in its economic value during this period. It
should be noted that historical book values and depreciation
patterns typically reflect neither capital market valuation of as-
sets in place nor economic depreciation. Thus, a transition from
historical cost accounting to current cost accounting necessarily
poses the problem of phantom costs due to overvaluation of ex-
isting network equipment.6 ° Phantom costs, however, should
not be confused with economically efficient forward-looking
costs of upgrading an existing network, i.e., path-dependency. A
periodical reevaluation of the assets and an adaptation of eco-
nomic depreciation rates seem unavoidable, especially in such
dynamic markets as telecommunications.
60. HoRsT ALBACH & GONTER KNIEPS, KOSTEN UND PREISE IN WETrBEWERBLICHEN
ORTSNETZEN [CosTs AND PRICES IN COMPETITIVE LocAL NETWORKS] 31 (1997).
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